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SpecForge Editorial Team

Gallium supply 2026: China's one-year pause fails to clear U.S. licensing backlog

Table of Contents
  1. What the November 2025 suspension actually changed
  2. Price signals, customs data, and the smuggling channel
  3. Where the metal actually comes from, and where it might
  4. Demand-side math: where U.S. consumption actually goes
  5. Who is exposed, and who is not
  6. What changes on November 27, 2026
Gallium supply 2026: China's one-year pause fails to clear U.S. licensing backlog

In 2025, U.S. imports of gallium metal jumped to an estimated 25,000 kg, more than double the 11,000 kg recorded in 2024, while the average unit value of imported metal climbed to $580/kg, roughly 30% above the 2024 level of $439/kg [S1].

Beijing's original August 2023 export controls and a full ban on U.S.-bound gallium imposed in December 2024 were nominally suspended for one year in November 2025, running until November 27, 2026 [S1][S5], but actual U.S.-destined shipments remain effectively blocked by a licensing backlog and unresolved dual-use reviews.

What the November 2025 suspension actually changed

The November 2025 announcement paused the "presumption-of-denial" rule for dual-use items including gallium, germanium, antimony, graphite, and superhard materials, suspending enhanced U.S.-focused licensing requirements until November 27, 2026 [S5][S6][S7].

On paper, the move restored eligibility for export licenses. In practice, AXT, a major gallium arsenide (GaAs) substrate producer with operations in both China and the United States, stated in its Q4 2025 earnings report that while permits for Asian and European destinations were generally being approved, no permits for GaAs exports to the United States had yet been approved because U.S. customers are classified as dual-use [S2]. Neo Performance Materials, the primary North American supplier via its Canada-U.S. cross-border network, reported in its Q4 2025 release that Chinese export restrictions continued to limit gallium availability and push prices higher, and that its recycling growth was constrained by limited gallium scrap supply [S2].

Price signals, customs data, and the smuggling channel

U.S. Import volumes at the same time suggest material is reaching the U.S. through non-Chinese or indirect channels: 2021–24 import sources for gallium metal were Canada 28%, Japan 22%, China 18%, Germany 16%, and other 16% [S1].

CSIS documented that in July 2025 a U.S. company reported Chinese suppliers shipping gallium mislabeled as other materials and routed through third countries to evade controls, a pattern incentivized by the global price surge and made harder to police because gallium trades in small lot sizes required only in modest volumes for many end uses [S2]. The same report flagged that customs agencies do not record gallium trade uniformly, and that affiliated-company transfers (for example, Neo Performance Materials moving material between its Canadian and U.S. facilities) inflate apparent cross-border volumes [S2].

Where the metal actually comes from, and where it might

Primary low-purity gallium is recovered predominantly as a byproduct of bauxite processing, with secondary byproduct output from zinc ores [S1]. No primary gallium has been recovered in the United States since 1987 [S1]. One company in New York recovered and refined high-purity gallium from imported primary low-purity gallium metal and new scrap [S1].

Several new projects were announced across Australia, Canada, Greece, Kazakhstan, and the Republic of Korea, but supply-gap analysis concludes that gallium and germanium constraints are no longer looking like a temporary response to export controls and that supply gaps could persist into the 2030 timeframe, even with new mine and refinery capacity [S8]. The Council on Foreign Relations frames gallium alongside rare earths, permanent magnets, and at least seven other materials as part of a wider network of Beijing-controlled industrial chokepoints spanning magnets, batteries, niche chemicals, gases, and legacy semiconductors [S3].

Demand-side math: where U.S. consumption actually goes

U.S. reported gallium consumption in 2025 was an estimated 19,000 kg, with 73% absorbed by integrated circuits and 26% by optoelectronic devices used in aerospace, consumer goods, industrial equipment, medical equipment, and telecommunications [S1]. Net import reliance stood at 100% of reported consumption, unchanged across 2021 through 2025 [S1].

U.S. substrate producers are running on lower wafer throughput even as raw metal imports are rebuilding [S1]. GaAs wafer imports carried a 2.8% ad valorem normal-trade-relations tariff for undoped wafers under HTS 2853.90.9010, with doped wafers (HTS 3818.00.0010) entering duty-free; gallium metal under HTS 8112.92.1000 carried a 3% ad valorem rate as of December 31, 2025 [S1].

Who is exposed, and who is not

Defense electronics programs, particularly radar and advanced communications, are the segment most exposed because GaAs and GaN devices are widely used in those applications and because Chinese dual-use review is least likely to clear U.S. defense end users [S2][S3]. Commercial optoelectronics (laser diodes, LEDs, photodetectors, solar cells) sit in the second tier, fed by the same dual-use licensing queue but with broader civilian end uses that are easier to argue under MOFCOM review.

Recycling-heavy buyers are partially insulated: one facility in New York recovers and refines high-purity gallium from imported primary low-purity metal and new scrap, and substantial quantities of new scrap from GaAs device manufacturing are reprocessed there, with no old-scrap recovery reported [S1]. Buyers tied to non-Chinese refiners in Canada, Japan, Germany, and South Korea face a different constraint: the upstream raw feed still traces back to Chinese primary production in roughly 99% of cases [S1][S2].

What changes on November 27, 2026

The one-year suspension announced in November 2025 expires on November 27, 2026, absent a renewal [S1][S5]. If licensing has not cleared by that date, the default rule reverts to the December 2024 full ban on U.S.-bound Chinese gallium, with export volumes likely remaining depressed [S2]. The October 9 rare-earth control package that would have extended license requirements to five additional rare earths and to components containing traces of China-produced material between third countries has been postponed to November 2026 while Beijing "studies and refines specific plans" [S3].

Trackable signals into Q1 2027: MOFCOM license-approval counts disclosed in AXT and Neo Performance Materials quarterly filings, the 2026 USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries update for gallium scheduled in early 2027, and any movement on new primary capacity in Australia, Canada, Greece, Kazakhstan, or the Republic of Korea [S1][S2][S3][S8]. For adjacent supply-chain coverage, see the auto-chip capacity analysis on how mature-node fabs are being absorbed by AI demand.

8 sources
  1. Gallium - Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 - USGS.gov
  2. The U.S.-China Trade Truce Has Not Solved the Gallium ... (May 11, 2026)
  3. Dismantling China's Supply-Chain Weapon (Sep 21, 2026)
  4. Xi Is Coming: Mineral and Chips Export Controls Loom (Sep 24, 2026)
  5. Gallium Export Ban Suspended by China Until 2026 (Nov 11, 2025)
  6. China Hits “Pause” on Rare-Earth Export Controls and ... (Nov 24, 2025)
  7. China Eases U.S. Export Controls on Gallium, Germanium, ... (Nov 14, 2025)
  8. Gallium and Germanium Supply Gaps Could Persist Through ... (Sep 21, 2026)

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